Can Deficits Finance Themselves?

Marios AngeletosChen LianChristian WolfNorthwesternBerkeleyMIT

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will get some "self-financing": deficit today \rightarrow demand boom \rightarrow tax base \uparrow , inflation \uparrow

• **Result**: if fiscal adjustment is sufficiently *delayed*, then *all* financing is **self-financing** Split depends on nominal rigidities. All via output/tax base \uparrow if rigid, all via prices \uparrow if flexible.

Environment

Non-policy block

• Aggregate demand

• Unit continuum of OLG households with survival probability $\omega \in (0, 1]$. Nests standard PIH model with $\omega = 1$, and mimics HANK with $\omega < 1$. Implies $\beta(1 + \overline{r}) = 1$, so $\overline{r} > 0 = g$.

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- Optimal consumption-savings behavior yields aggregate demand relation:

 Details

$$c_{t} = \underbrace{(1 - \beta \omega)}_{\text{MPC}} \times \left(\underbrace{d_{t}}_{\text{wealth}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \omega)^{k} (y_{t+k} - t_{t+k})\right]}_{\text{post-tax income}} - \underbrace{\gamma \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \omega)^{k} r_{t+k}\right]}_{\text{real rates}}\right) \quad (1)$$

Key features: (i) elevated MPC + (ii) addt'l discounting of future income & taxes

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Aggregate supply

Standard labor supply + nominal rigidities + lump-sum taxes yields NKPC

 Details

$$\pi_t = \kappa y_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\pi_{t+1} \right] \tag{2}$$

- Monetary policy
 - $\circ~$ Set rate on 1-period nominal bonds. Let ϕ index the cyclicality of the implied real rate:

$$\underbrace{i_t - \mathbb{E}_t \left[\pi_{t+1} \right]}_{\equiv r_t} = \phi \times y_t \tag{3}$$

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 - Issue nominal debt b_t . Log-linearized government budget constraint (in real terms d_t):

$$d_{t+1} = (1+\bar{r}) \times (d_t - t_t) + \frac{\bar{d}}{\bar{y}} r_t - \frac{\bar{d}}{\bar{y}} (\pi_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t [\pi_{t+1}])$$
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(4)

 $\circ~$ Taxes [lump-sum] adjust gradually to balance gov't budget, where τ_d parameterizes delay:

$$t_{t} = \underbrace{\tau_{d} \times (d_{t} + \varepsilon_{t})}_{\text{fiscal adjustment}} + \underbrace{\tau_{y} y_{t}}_{\text{tax base financing}} - \underbrace{\varepsilon_{t}}_{\text{"stimulus checks"}}$$
(5)

Policv


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Equilibrium & sources of financing

• Eq'm existence & uniqueness • Full eq'm characterization

Proposition

Suppose that $\omega < 1$ and $\tau_y > 0$. The economy (1) - (5) has a unique bounded eq'm.

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Suppose that $\omega < 1$ and $\tau_y > 0$. The economy (1) - (5) has a unique bounded eq'm.

- Our **Q**: how are fiscal deficits in this eq'm financed?
 - From the intertemporal gov't budget constraint:

$$\underbrace{\varepsilon_{0}}_{\text{deficit}} = \underbrace{\tau_{d} \times \left(\varepsilon_{0} + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^{k} \mathbb{E}_{0}\left(d_{k}\right)\right)}_{\text{fiscal adjustment: } (1-\nu) \times \varepsilon_{0}} + \underbrace{\frac{\overline{d}}{\overline{y}} \left(\pi_{0} - \mathbb{E}_{-1}\left(\pi_{0}\right)\right)}_{\text{self-financing}} + \underbrace{\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^{k} \tau_{y} \mathbb{E}_{0}\left(y_{k}\right)}_{\text{self-financing}}$$

• Next: characterize ν as a function of fiscal adjustment delay (τ_d or H)

The Self-Financing Result

Theorem

Suppose that $\omega < 1$ and $\tau_{\nu} > 0$. The self-financing share ν has the following properties:

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Theorem


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
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- 2. **[Limit]** As fiscal financing is delayed more and more (i.e., as $H \to \infty$ or $\tau_d \to 0$), ν converges to 1. In words, delaying the tax hike makes it vanish.


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
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
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 - a) Gov't debt returns to steady state even without any fiscal adjustment.
 - b) The share of self-financing coming from the tax base expansion is increasing in the strength of nominal rigidities. With rigid prices the cumulative output multiplier is $\frac{1}{\tau_v}$.











if fiscal adjustment is delayed, then financing will come via eq'm prices & quantities

• Background: self-financing in a "static" Keynesian cross w/ our tax base channel

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
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 - PE Largely discount date-H tax hike + spend date-0 gain quickly, so short-run PE effect reaches 1 far before H—akin to numerator above. Then get later demand bust around H.



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
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
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With imperfectly rigid prices: boom partially leaks into prices instead of quantities.

Practical Relevance

Extensions & generality

1. Policy Details

- Fiscal policy: distortionary taxes, gov't purchases
- Monetary response
 - $\rightarrow~$ Intuition: $\phi < 0$ accelerates the Keynesian cross, $\phi > 0$ delays it
 - → Length of eq'm boom is increasing in ϕ . Full self-financing feasible if $\phi < \overline{\phi}$, where $\overline{\phi} > 0$. More generally: increasing borrowing costs limit room for self-financing.

2. Economic environment Details

- $\circ\,$ Rest of the economy: open economy ($\nu\downarrow$!), different NKPC, wage rigidity, investment
- Demand relation
 - $\rightarrow~$ Need discounting—break Ricardian equivalence + front-load spending.
 - $\rightarrow~$ Same result (numerically) in HANK. Why? OLG AD f'n \approx HANK AD f'n. $[{\rm Wolf}~(2023)]$

Self-financing in the quantitative model

Environment: match evidence on dynamic (tail) MPCs + speed of fiscal adjustment

Rest of model: flat NKPC + acyclical real rate, consistent with pre-covid empirical evidence.


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Takeaways

• Main result: if fiscal adjustment is delayed, then financing will instead come from debt erosion & tax base boom—i.e., self-financing

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Implications

- a) Theory: grounded in classical failure of Ricardian equivalence + emphasize y vs. p vs. FTPL: no discontinuity in adjustment horizon. Delayed adjustment = never adjust. Pletails
- b) Practice: self-sustaining stimulus may be less implausible than commonly believed In particular if supply constraints are slack—get self-financing via protracted output boom.

Thank you!

Appendix

Aggregate demand

- Consumption-savings problem
 - \circ OLG hh's with survival probability $\omega \in (0, 1]$ [can interpret as pprox 1 prob. of liq. constraint]

$$\mathbb{E}_t\left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty}\left(\beta\omega\right)^k\left[u(C_{i,t+k})-v(L_{i,t+k})\right]\right]$$

• Invest in actuarially fair annuities. Budget constraint:

$$A_{i,t+1} = \underbrace{\frac{I_t}{\omega}}_{\text{annuity}} (A_{i,t} + P_t \cdot (\underbrace{W_t L_{i,t} + Q_{i,t}}_{Y_{i,t}} - C_{i,t} - T_{i,t} + \text{transfer to newborns}))$$

• Aggregate demand relation

$$c_{t} = \underbrace{(1 - \beta \omega)}_{\text{MPC}} \times \underbrace{\left(\underbrace{d_{t}}_{\text{wealth}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{t}\left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \omega)^{k} (y_{t+k} - t_{t+k})\right]}_{\text{post-tax income}} - \underbrace{\gamma \mathbb{E}_{t}\left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \omega)^{k} r_{t+k}\right]}_{\text{real rates}}\right)$$
(6)

Key features: (i) elevated MPC + (ii) addt'l discounting of future income & taxes

Aggregate supply

• Unions equalize post-tax wage and average consumption-labor MRS. This gives

$$(1 - \tau_y)W_t = \frac{\chi \int_0^1 L_{i,t}^{\frac{1}{\varphi}} di}{\int_0^1 C_{i,t}^{-1/\sigma} di}$$

Log-linearizing:

$$\frac{1}{\varphi}\ell_t = w_t - \frac{1}{\sigma}c_t$$

• Combining with optimal firm pricing decisions we get the NKPC:

$$\pi_t = \kappa y_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\pi_{t+1} \right]$$

 $\circ~$ Note: no time-varying wedge since distortionary taxes τ_y are fixed

Equilibrium characterization

- · First step to eq'm characterization is a more concise representation of agg. demand
- Combining (1), (3), (4), (5), and output market-clearing, we get

$$y_{t} = \mathcal{F}_{1} \cdot (d_{t} + \varepsilon_{t}) + \mathcal{F}_{2} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \omega)^{k} y_{t+k} \right]$$
(7)

$$\circ \ \, \mathsf{Here:} \ \, \mathcal{F}_1 \equiv \tfrac{(1-\beta\omega)(1-\omega)(1-\tau_d)}{1-\omega(1-\tau_d)} \ \, \mathsf{and} \ \, \mathcal{F}_2 = (1-\beta\omega)\left(1-\tfrac{(1-\omega)\tau_y}{1-\omega(1-\tau_d)}\right)$$

- Note: $\mathcal{F}_1 = 0$ if $\omega = 1$ —reflects lack of direct effect of deficit on consumer spending/ aggregate demand under Ricardian equivalence
- Equilibrium: (2), (7) and law of motion for government debt

Equilibrium characterization

- We will look for bounded equilibria in the sense of Blanchard-Kahn
 - Note: in our case—with $\omega < 1$ and $\tau_y > 0$ —this is enough to rule out sunspot solutions. Recover same eq'm through limit $\phi \to 0^+$.
- The unique bounded eq'm takes a particularly simple form:

$$y_t = \chi(d_t + \varepsilon_t), \quad \mathbb{E}_t [d_{t+1}] = \rho_d(d_t + \varepsilon_t)$$

where $\chi > 0$ (deficits trigger boom) and $0 <
ho_d < 1$ (debt goes back to steady state).

Relation to classical FTPL

Only difference in non-policy block is non-PIH consumers. How does that change things?

- Key implication: can get "self-financing" with conventional policy mix
 - \circ Recall: fiscal policy is "Ricardian" in the usual sense + Taylor principle is satisfied
 - This takes care of some of the literature's **conceptual concerns** with the classical FTPL:
 - a) No need for fiscal authority to never adjust. A finite delay is enough.
 - b) Not vulnerable to behavioral frictions that complicate coordination [Angeletos-Lian]
- Secondary insight: focus attention away from prices and on tax base channel Robust insight is that eq'm outcomes adjust to finance the deficit—not whether it's prices or quantities.

Distortionary fiscal financing

Environment

• Fiscal adjustment now instead through distortionary tax adjustments. Specifically:

$$\tau_{y,t} = \tau_y + \tau_{d,t}(D_t - D^{ss})$$


• Only effect is to change (2) to

$$\pi_t = \kappa y_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\pi_{t+1} \right] + \zeta_t d_t$$

• Self-financing result

- Easy to see: exactly the same limiting self-financing eq'm as before
- · Why? tax adjustment not necessary, so distortionary vs non-distortionary is irrelevant

Government purchases



Monetary policy reaction

• Intuition: $\phi < 0$ accelerates the Keynesian cross, $\phi > 0$ delays it

Proposition

There exists a $\bar{\phi} > 0$ such that:


- 1. An equilibrium with full self-financing exists if and only if $\phi < \overline{\phi}$.
- 2. The persistence of $\rho_d(\phi)$ of gov't debt (and output) in the equilibrium with full self-financing is increasing in ϕ , with $\rho_d(0) \in (0, 1)$ and $\rho_d(\bar{\phi}) = 1$.

Note: same logic for standard Taylor-type rules like $i_t = \phi \times \pi_t$.


- What happens if $\phi > \overline{\phi}$? Depends on fiscal adjustment:
 - If too delayed then no bounded eq'm exists. For such an aggressive monetary policy fiscal adjustment needs to be *fast enough*.
 - If adjustment is fast enough then there is partial but not complete self-financing.

▶ back

Leeper regions



Leeper regions



A generalized aggregate demand relation

- Important: our results are not tied to the particular OLG microfoundations
- Instead: it's all about two empirically plausible features of consumer demand
 - 1. Discounting: households at date t = 0 respond little to expectations of far-ahead tax hikes
 - 2. Front-loaded spending: transfer receipt (and higher-order GE income) is spent quickly

in OLG both of these are ensured by $\omega < 1$

• Will formalize this using the following generalized AD relation:

$$c_t = M_d d_t + M_y \left(y_t - t_t + \delta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \omega)^k (y_{t+k} - t_{t+k}) \right] \right)$$

Rich enough to nest PIH, OLG, spender-saver, spender-OLG, behavioral discounting, Also can provide very close reduced-form fit to consumer behavior in quantitative HANK models.

A generalized aggregate demand relation

- Headline result: sufficient conditions for self-financing
 - A1 **Discounting**

 $\omega < 1$

Transfer today and taxes in the future redistribute from future generations to the present.

A2 Front-loading

$$M_d + rac{1-eta}{ au_y}(1- au_y)M_y\left(1+\deltarac{eta\omega}{1-eta\omega}
ight) > rac{1-eta}{ au_y}$$

Self-financing boom is front-loaded enough to deliver $\rho_d < 1$.

• Note: the self-financing result fails if there are PIH households


"Deep-pocket" rational investor intuition-infinitely elastic PIH hh's link infinite future & present.

Adding permanent-income consumers

- Adding a margin of **PIH consumers** connects the present with the (infinite) future
 - \circ Implication: policy at *H* invariably affects short-run, for any *H*. No more separation.
 - With our baseline policy ($\phi = 0$, uniform taxes): invariably get $\nu = 0$, since otherwise PIH consumption would be permanently away from steady state
- Is this a practically relevant consideration? Not really:
 - 1. Result driven by extreme feature of PIH model: infinite elasticity of hh asset demand
 - In multi-type OLG model: self-financing th'm applies iff interest rate elasticity is finite
 - Quantitative analysis [incl. HANK]: finite elasticity, obtain self-financing
 - 2. Other policy mixes at H deliver smoothness of ν in PIH share
 - Alternatives at H: MP stabilizes the bust around H, or date-H taxes only on PIH consumers
 - Then ν is continuous in PIH share θ : $\nu \rightarrow \frac{\tau_y(1-\theta)}{1-(1-\tau_y)(1-\theta)} < 1$


The importance of discounting

spender-saver model



🕩 back 🖉

The importance of discounting



hybrid spender-OLG model

🕨 back 🖉

Adding investment

• Environment

- **Households**: receive labor income plus dividends e_t . Pay taxes τ_y on both.
- Production: standard DSGE production block. Key twist: no tax payments anywhere.

• Self-financing result

- For rigid prices exactly the same self-financing eq'm as before. Why? Keynesian cross & gov't budget both have c_t rather than y_t in them, so same pair of equations as before
- Partially sticky prices: more complicated mapping from {c_t}[∞]_{t=0} back to π₀, so fixed point is more complicated, but can still show that self-financing eq'm exists
 Perfectly analogous to change in NKPC. Just change mapping into π₀.

Open economy

• Environment

- *N* countries (all = baseline economy)
 - $\circ~$ Each country produces a single good, and consumes both the domestic and foreign goods
 - For simplicity: fixed real rates and prices, so fixed exchange rates. Gives simple international Intertemporal Keynesian Cross.
- \circ Policy experiment: fiscal stimulus in country *i*


• Self-financing result

- If *H* is finite for all countries -i, then $\nu_i \to 1$ as $H \to \infty$ Same conclusion for $\tau_{d,-i} > 0$ and $\tau_{d,i} \to 0$.
- Quantitative: convergence to full self-financing (much) delayed due to leakage abroad

Alternative calibration strategies


Baseline: match impact and short-run MPCs, then extrapolate

Note: also consistent with evidence on long-run elasticity of asset supply.




Alternative calibration strategies

Extension: two-type OLG + spender model to match cumulative MPC time profile This gives $\omega_2 = 0.97$, and thus counterfactually elastic asset supply ($\approx 7x$ emp. upper bound).



More flexible prices

Steeper NKPC: arguably more informative about post-covid episode Takeaways: (i) change ν_y/ν_p split & (ii) faster convergence to self-financing limit




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Active monetary policy reaction


Monetary response: consider standard Taylor rule $i_t = \phi \times \pi_t$

Takeaways: (i) slower convergence & (ii) no self-financing eq'm exists for sufficiently large ϕ




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Other models



Environment: baseline + behavioral friction [strong cognitive discounting]

Other models



Environment: HANK model [similar to Wolf (2023)]